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Firstly, a basic understanding of economic competition and its role in the lives 
of the youth is presented. Then two forces are described which have affected the 
lowest echelons of the labour competition market during the last decade and 
the political reactions (xenophobic, anti–system) which ensued. Finally, some 
ideas are summarized which were presented at the discussion on the competitive 
impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on the labour market, some of the responses 
proposed and the basic difficulties that affect them. We conclude that one must 
expect further political convulsions following infringements of the AI upon the 
structure of the youth labour market.
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phobia, anti–system politics
Introduction
Important political phenomena are taking place in Europe as in other parts 
of the world. The electoral rise of xenophobia, local and country nationalisms, 
anti–system far–left movements, authoritarian political positions — to the point 
of reaching, almost–reaching or strongly influencing governments all over the 
Continent — show a deep change in the political sentiments of the populations 
of the world.
“Politics as usual” with its moderate pro–European Union governments 
seems to be becoming weaker by the month. Many of the remaining presidents 
of the “old politics” are seen as the “last opportunity” for such an approach, 
as they are being faced with growing radicalisms within their own countries. In 
other places such as the United Kingdom, Italy or Hungary, recent governments 
have made decisions which threaten the very existence of the European Union.
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The changes in popular political sentiment behind these phenomena may be 
described as a matter of identity, be it national, ideological and/or generational. 
However, the fact that they emerged in the aftermath of a financial crisis, sugge-
sts that one is to search firstly for the economic roots of the phenomena. Perhaps 
reflection on the situation faced by the youth as they enter the labour market of 
a consumer society, will allow for a better understanding of the recent popularity 
of identity politics. It may also help to forecast whether it is here to stay.
1. Economic Competition
1.1.  Economy and individual life
The economy shall be understood here as a system of social coordination 
involving goods and services that are scarce, measurable and transferable. The 
joint production and the distribution/redistribution of such goods and services 
create the nucleus of economic activity.
Any system of social coordination materializes in concrete relations which 
can be very diverse. Different social institutions such as families–friends, pu-
blic agencies, companies, markets, communes, etc., have their own ways of 
carrying out production–distribution/redistribution each in accordance with its 
own rules.
The individual is economically well integrated if he/she can sustain1 enough 
of these relations as to develop a personal project at the level of what is common 
in one’s social milieu (whatever the person considers one’s society, against which 
one measures relative success or failure, to be). Redundance (fall–back positions 
built into the system) and social security networks are important for the robus-
tness of an individual’s economic project.
Nowadays three elements are relevant in the experience of most European 
youth:
(1)  Their society of reference is the global consumer society.
(2)  The most relevant way to integrate into the economy is success in the
 markets for whatever they may have to “sell”.
(3)  Nation States and families are weakening progressively as providers of 
 fall–back positions and social security networks.
These three elements point in the same direction: impersonal relations based 
on competitiveness (see 1.2. below) are becoming more crucial to the economic 
integration of each person. At the same time, less can be expected from imper-
sonal relations based on rights and duties (as typically happen in the State), and 
1 “Can sustain” means both that the person is entitled to take part in the collaboration relationship 
of reference, and that he/she is materially enabled to offer what he/she must contribute to that 
relationship. The two aspects can go together (as is usually the case in the rights of citizenship, 
for instance), or be separated (as for taking part in a certain market: you can have the money but 
not be allowed to buy a weapon; you can be allowed to buy a car but have not the money).
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from interpersonal relations (typically happening through families, friends and 
other communities).
Not that the economic role of these other relations and the institutions built 
upon them has become irrelevant. It is still very important for several reasons, 
all of which cannot be listed here. But they certainly do include their usefulness 
as leverage points for integration into the markets (for example, to land a job). 
However, failure to achieve collaboration through market exchanges is almost 
equivalent to economic failure for most adults between 25 and 65. This is impor-
tant for an understanding of the predicament of populism.
Before moving on to this point, we must have a brief look at the structure of 
competition.
1.2. The dynamics of competition
Capitalism is an institutional arrangement of (a part of) the economy based 
on private property and individual liberty of contract for some sorts of goods, 
services and values,2 including most means of production. There are always some 
other goods, services and values that are dealt with through non–capitalist arran-
gements. 
Markets are mechanisms of collaboration based on a voluntary exchange of 
goods, services and values under private property. They are obviously linked to 
capitalism: without an institutional guarantee regarding private property and 
freedom of contract extending to the means essential for production, there can 
hardly be a market of any kind.
Given the scarcity of the objects being traded and the voluntariness of the 
transactions, if there is a plurality of agents on a side of a certain market, there 
will be competition among them.
Competition is a relationship consisting of two basic elements which are in-
tertwined: cooperation to establish the rules of the game, and conflict to win the 
game. If any of the agents competing is, in turn, an organization or an alliance 
of organizations, internal cooperation is necessary to achieve success in the com-
petition, though internal conflict may also arise in the course of the external 
competition.
With this characterization in mind, conflict over the rules of this very same 
competition is not logically possible. If we are competing for certain competition 
norms, this is a different sort of competition from the one to have these norms as 
rules. For example, the rules for a certain market (economic competition) are set 
up in another (“higher level”) competition, namely, a political one.
Economic competition is characteristically the type of competition to be cho-
sen. Countries strive for an influx of foreign investments and tourists, for com-
panies to sell their products, for workers to get jobs, brokers to achieve better 
risk–return and then to attract more investors, the media competes for bigger 
audiences and, consequently, more expensive publicity, etc.
2 Monetary values, that is, purchasing power in time, in consequence affected by risk and volatility.
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There are varying degrees of success in economic competition. At one 
extreme, success means winning to such extent that no competitor can win the 
following rounds of the same competition (because success in the current round 
gives you resources that incapacitate all possible competitors in the next rounds). 
Then, competition tends to end in monopolies or positions so dominant that no 
further competitive threat is to be feared. It liquidates itself.
At another extreme, success in economic competition may mean being cho-
sen by “clients” so as to remain a viable competitor in the next rounds of the 
same competition. Failure then means to be expelled from that competition, 
to become “unchoosable”. This is an evolutionary concept of success: whatever 
conduct produces a systemic competition disadvantage in the beholder, will be-
come extinct sooner rather than later.
The rest of the competitions can be mapped between these, whereby each 
competitor reaches success more than adequately to remain viable in the next 
rounds of the same competition, but not to the degree that he could expel all 
other possible competitors. The two extremes, however, point to two main mo-
tivators in economic competition, namely, greed and fear: greed which will end 
competition and empower the competitor to exploit a monopoly (all literatu-
re on finding niches in the market heads in that direction), and fear of being 
expelled and thus losing a preferred manner of achieving economic integration. 
Fall–back positions await, either within the market or outside it (social secu-
rity).
The logic of competition (cooperation plus conflict) suggests that competiti-
ons must be set up such that nothing essential is endangered by the conflict. If the 
rules are the same for all competitors, as they must be, no one loses due to the 
fact that a certain aspect (the common good, for instance) is protected by incor-
porating rules intended to safeguard it from competition. Competitors will fight 
under those rules, equal for all. In other words, some aspects will not be open to 
gaining competitive advantage through them. They will be left out of the realm 
of freedoms from which to choose. Obviously, these aspects must be essential 
for the functioning of society (including competition itself, the very existence of 
which must be legally protected), because otherwise it would be morally difficult 
to justify the suppression of liberty regarding these aspects.
This seems obvious, but only from an abstract point of view. In practice, 
it imposes a requirement which often does not occur: the institutional space 
within which the rules of a competition are established, must be the same or 
broader than the space of the competitive conflict. If we have a global compe-
tition, but only a national or regional capacity for establishing the rules for it, 
the competition will likely extend to the rules, there will be conflict over them 
(a “rat race” for example), and thus these rules will not be the real rules for the 
original competition.
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2. Competitive Positions and Political Reactions
2.1. The youth in competition
In our society, the market consumption levels are essential for social integra-
tion. In order to obtain an income for consumption expenses, most people must 
sell their labour (time, effort, and skills) on the labour market. Thus, to remain 
viable on the demand side of other markets, most young people must also be 
successful on the supply side of the labour market.
On the other hand, having a job is also the main way in which to fully incorpo-
rate oneself into the social security system, which provides health and disability 
care, retirement and other pensions, and unemployment subsidies.
The purpose of economic success is not merely reaching a level of consumpti-
on that allows for integration into the social world from which young people ori-
ginate. It also requires maintaining it in time and ensuring government support, 
such as is granted by the social security system, until one’s retirement date. Mo-
reover, given that young people3 are about to start or already have started a life 
project, they need some security regarding their future consumption possibilities 
and government support, thus their future income. Life projects (buying a house, 
starting a family...) are built on personal economic stability.
Being in competition for a job is a key factor in economic competition for 
most young adults, and it has two important political consequences.
2.2. The reason for xenophobia
If migrants from foreign countries increase the competition in the labour 
market segment where one also competes for a job, this tends prima facie to 
lower salaries on that market and/or increase unemployment. The other effect 
(migrants are also on the demand side as their presence increases the aggregate 
demand and, consequentially, jobs are created) is more diffuse: competition of 
foreigners on my job market can be seen easily, while the aggregate demand 
effect takes place throughout the economic system.
Most migrants are both young and poor. Their professional qualifications are 
often disregarded, and so they must enter the labour market at its lowest levels. 
However, by virtue of the fact that they have undertaken to migrate, they have 
demonstrated considerable bravery and personal initiative. Also, they very often 
lack family security networks and are lacking social rights in the receiving coun-
try, so they must necessarily be successful on the market. Taking into account all 
these factors, they are in substantial competition with the less–prepared dome-
stic youth.
3 »The definition of a young worker depends on the policy context: EU legislation aiming to pro-
tect young workers defines a young worker as under the age of 18, while statistics cover the 
15–24–year age group and EU policy initiatives aimed at young workers can be broader, covering 
workers up to the age of 30« (EurWORK, 2011).
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On the other hand, the local, non–migrant young people also have some com-
petitive advantages. They are generally better integrated into the educational 
and social security systems, they have family and other social networks, they spe-
ak the local language as their mother tongue and act spontaneously according to 
the local custom
Still, one is easily tempted to “win” the competition for jobs, not through 
these advantages, but rather by making political moves to prompt the national 
government to exclude migrants from the labour market. The most expedient 
way is to exclude them physically from national territory. In this case, they are 
unable to even compete in the informal economy (which in turn competes with 
the formal).
This is a reason based on competitiveness on which national–identity politi-
cal projects which appeal to the less–prepared youth may be built: the nation is 
your main asset in the labour competition, given that you have not much more 
to make you be modestly successful on the job market, success on which your life 
project depends. 
Nationalism, ethnocultural identity, legality, security, public health, etc. — 
all these can provide arguments for such political projects. Once they become 
popular somehow, they can acquire a life of their own with a stronger or wea-
ker foothold in reality. For example, they may gain a firm foothold through the 
difficulties in living together with people from different cultural backgrounds, 
amplified by the mass media. This problem affects the local poor and low–middle 
classes — and with them the elderly — much moreso than the well–to–do and 
the rich, since migrants obviously rarely live in the same neighbourhoods as the 
latter, except as servants.
In my opinion, however, it would be erroneous to disregard economic com-
petition “at the bottom of the pyramid” as a driving force of xenophobic political 
identities. The corresponding sentiment cannot be easily fought by mere ideo-
logical means. Tolerance education, universalist predications, religious motives, 
etc., quite often come from social sectors that do not have to live together or 
compete with the less fortunate migrants.
Those most affected by external labour competition are the less–educated 
youth of each country for whom the relative importance of ideology is not the 
same as for better–situated individuals. It is easier to subscribe to a “we first” 
ideology when one has immediate economic fears regarding the only article one 
has to sell. It is also easier to depict “globalism”, “Europeanism” and the like as 
ideologies for successful elites, while the common folk depend on the State to 
safeguard their precarious economic opportunities (Le Pen, 2012).
2.3. Anti–system
The economic crisis produced a jump in unemployment all over Europe. The 
first to be fired were often the young people, because the cost of firing them was 
less.
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Also, depending on the legal framework of each national job market, the 
crisis led to changes in the labour regime, affecting mainly new jobs (the exi-
sting ones often enjoy acquired rights that could not be easily reduced). It makes 
microeconomic sense: by lowering the price of merchandise (labour) the amount 
demanded increases (employment).
However, depending on individual countries, this has achieved three results 
which together may be called the “precarization” of labour:
• Lower real salaries than past generations at the same age–level. More un-
certainty regarding evolution of salaries over one’s lifetime.
• More temporal short–term internship service, zero–hours, etc., contracts, 
in proportion.
• More undesired part–time jobs, without the opportunity for full–time 
work, in proportion.
Numerical details about the last two aspects (up to 2015) can be found in the 
briefings of the “Pay Rise Campaign”4 of the European Trade Union Confede-
ration, a broad umbrella organization that groups together most of the big trade 
unions in the EU.
As already mentioned, labour is not common merchandise in our system, 
rather it is moreso related to life–project and social integration since for young 
people the perspectives of job stability/employability are crucial. Being at a risk–
4 See the “youth briefings” of the campaign: https://payrise.eu/. A more detailed study, that con-
firms all the basic points used by the trade unions in their campaign, can be found in Broughton 
et alia (2016). Some of the issues are also confirmed by the OECD Employment Outlook 2018.
Figure 1. Unemployment rate EU28, according to age. 
Graf. 1. Dobna stopa nezaposlenosti u EU28.
Source for data: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/–/tepsr_wc170
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of–poverty level at the very age when one should be embarking on a family pro-
ject is dramatic.
Figure 2. At–risk–of poverty rate by age EU27. Source for data: http://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products–datasets/–/tessi120
Graf. 2. Dobna stopa opasnosti od siromaštva. Izvor podataka: http://ec.europa.
eu/eurostat/web/products–datasets/–/tessi120
Precarity of employment may easily produce political disaffection: if “the 
system” has no decent place for me, then the system has no place inside me, in 
my political loyalties. The number of anti–system youth is called to grow as more 
young people feel at risk of being excluded from the system itself (in the sense 
of being able to sell their labour in conditions that are good enough to ensure 
the means to pursue their projects). The perspective of exclusion engenders re-
sentment, which makes a good political mobilizer.
Anti–system does not necessarily mean populist. Populism is merely a politi-
cal approach that may put this resentment to use, both in the streets and at elec-
tion time. There are however some other anti–system expressions, for example, 
international migration: instead of trying to topple the system, the international 
migrant leaves it in search of a better place; or, political demobilization tout 
court, if no candidate seems to offer a way out of my current predicament.
3. A growing form of competition
3.1. Artificial intelligence
The fiercest competition that young workers are facing, whether they are 
aware of it or not, is not against foreigners but against machines. This kind of 
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competition extends far beyond class boundaries, because with the irruption of 
artificial intelligence (AI), machines are doing not only more kinds of physical 
work (as has been the case since the Iron Age itself) but also more kinds of in-
tellectual work on manifold levels, culminating in deep learning and the ability of 
computers to reprogram themselves.
In fact, production tasks not entailing physical activity or contact are experi-
encing a quicker technological growth than robotics and similar fields that have 
a physical component. It is easier for a computer to merely compute than to 
control a physical agent. However, computing and learning from the practical 
results of previous computations is crucial in many jobs, such as, medical dia-
gnosis, preparation of legal cases, industrial design, store management, financial 
trading, translation, driving, etc.
The development speed of AI is exponential, as Kurzweil (2005, 118) reflects. 
His prognosis has proven to be accurate for the time being, namely, nowadays 
computers have “intellectual” capacities at the level of a monkey. This is logical 
because computers are designed by using other computers, so that the process is 
cumulative and, in fact, more than exponential (Fig. 3).
Figure 3. Exponential Growth of Computing. Twentieth through twenty first 
century. 
Graf. 3. Eksponencijalni rast računanja kroz 20 i 21. stoljeće. 
Source: Kurzweil, 2005, 118.
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On the other hand, human learning must start incorporating the cultural as-
pect through a lengthy educational process. Then one can, in time, contribute to 
advance that aspect for the following generations. This occurs via complex social 
systems, with viral spreads, mutual nullifications, conflicts, political structures 
that foster or render difficult certain advancements.
Though in the end there is quantitative progress in the joint human ability to 
handle information — through both the increase in population and the advance-
ment of cultural starting points — the process cannot be considered at all expo-
nential, but rather perhaps linear with stationary stages and even downturns.
This can be easily seen in all moral processes. No analyst to our knowled-
ge would maintain that we are on the brink of an exponential explosion of de-
sirable ethical qualities or of political qualities in our communities and public 
organizations. Our collective moral development (where machines are of little 
relevance) is much slower than our technological development (where machines 
play a paramount role). The expanding gap between creating new technological 
possibilities and handling them in a morally positive way makes a good foundati-
on for all sorts of doomsday prophecies (mainly ecological and demographic, at 
this moment). As only one doomsday is needed to put an end to everything, past 
failures of such predictions (about atomic arsenals, for example) do not have a 
terribly tranquilizing effect with regard to the future.
Neither is it odd that many entrust the resolution of humanity’s major pro-
blems (poverty, mass migrations, ecological conservation, and the like) to tech-
nological rather than to moral progress. The estimation that neither people nor 
political organizations are going to improve much in regard to the time required 
to resolve these problems, backs the conservative position that the said problems 
must be treated through technological progress, market mechanisms and, in ge-
neral, procedures that are simple in their moral requirements. Moral improve-
ment would surely help, but it cannot be relied upon as the key for confronting 
really big, doom–and–gloom scenarios.
3.2. Machine competition and the youth labour market
Returning to the problem of competition in the labour market, machines can 
compete with the human labour force in several ways:
• By completely replacing workers in certain functions, or substituting new 
functions suitable for machine execution for some old functions requiring 
people.
• By replacing workers with machine plus client time (“prosumers”), who 
will get a lower price, a more personalized and/or instantaneous goods/
services, as a reward for their contribution.
• By replacing highly skilled workers with less–skilled (thus cheaper) wor-
kers assisted by machines which assess the situation as relevant and tell the 
worker what to do.
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• By creating new groups of functions (products/services) that can be profi-
table only by relying heavily on machines, and substituting them for goods 
and services with a larger human work ingredient. 
All this is already happening at a speed due to increase because of basic re-
search and technological applications. The main driving force behind it is clearly 
private capital. In consequence, we can expect that wherever machines can eco-
nomically replace workers in the future, they will do so. Workers have moods, 
illnesses, professional health and rest time requirements, families, labour rights 
and trade unions, none of which machines have. The competitive advantage for 
companies using machines in lieu of people where profitable is tautological. Also, 
much money is being invested in technological research aimed at generating that 
advantage and improving “machine workers”.
A few results of the above which can already be seen, in addition to the three 
points related to the precarization of human work mentioned above:
• Dualization of the labour market: humans are proving to be more difficult 
to replace with machines at unqualified physical work that requires quick, 
precise and unpredictable movements. This is usually a low–paying job. 
Also, intellectual work that requires some kind of creativity–based explo-
ration and/or interpersonal intelligence (invention, design, high manage-
ment, politics) is difficult to replace. Machines can raise the productivity 
of these jobs (and thus their pay rate), but do not replace them well. The 
capacity of machines to replace workers (and/or lower salaries and pre-
carize work) is likely to impact middle–level jobs moreso, both manual 
(drivers, for example) and intellectual (traders, for example).
• Displacement of the niches for human work: in areas directly related to 
the care for human subjectivity, substituting machines for human workers 
seems more difficult, maybe impossible at the current level of technolo-
gical development. This includes services for the most part: education, 
training, psychology, spirituality, organization, retirement, care–giving, 
etc. They are labour–intensive and consequently expensive, which implies 
that:
• There is a strong incentive to research new technologies in order to 
automate them, even partially.
• More efficient production in other sectors (thanks to digitalization and 
automation) may generate an additional surplus to be socially invested 
in this kind of service, keeping them human.
3.3. Options
The options for young people to remain competitive in the labour market de-
pend on the diagnostics of the situation, that is, on the perceived future balance 
between different competitors. The following five positions can be drawn:
1.  There is no hard problem. As has happened many times in the past (the 
Luddite scare, for example), new technological advancements will simply 
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displace human work to new fields. New demands will appear as techno-
logy makes society more, not less rich. The general balance of jobs will 
finally be positive,5 even with regard to the expected demographic growth. 
The challenge is thus educational: to prepare people for the functions pe-
ople are going to perform in the future, not in the present.
2. There is a hard problem, but it can be solved by developing a large num-
ber of new middle–range jobs consisting in handling machines for clients 
(installing, teaching, repairing, replacing, updating...). This would requ-
ire a strong commitment of the government to that particular business 
model,6 which makes sense because the cost of unemployment is high for 
the government. It would have the additional advantage of technological 
gadgets reusing / recycling, and thus diminished ecological impact. The cu-
rrent model is rather one of cheap, easily usable, discardable technologies, 
which requires little assistance but results in huge piles of trash.
3. There is a hard problem, the basic solution of which is moral: to put the 
economy at the service of the people once again, by modulating techno-
logy as convenient for human purposes, of which the creation of jobs is an 
anthropologically very relevant one. As Pope Francis says: “We have the 
freedom needed to limit and direct technology; we can put it at the service 
of another type of progress, one which is healthier, more human, more 
social, more integral” (LS, 112).
4. There is a hard problem with no solution within the private sector econo-
mic competition, because of the competitive advantage of digitalizing ope-
rations and the lack of global political mechanisms to set competitive con-
ditions for all companies at the same time.7 Income and social integration 
must thus be decoupled from jobs for most people, through some kind 
of “universal (citizen) basic income” provided by the State8. This income 
would be funded by means of high taxes on companies which produce 
much wealth with little employment. In this way, we would use machines 
to liberate our civilization from the obligation of working to survive (“the 
Genesis” curse). “Work” would acquire a different anthropological mea-
5 It must be noticed that the recent serious proponents of this idea use 2030 as their horizon for 
estimation, for example, Besser (2015) and McKinsey GI (2017). This is because all technologies 
that will be implemented at an industrial scale in 2030 can be supposed to exist already. They 
cannot go much further in time, realistically. But 2030 is a very short educational horizon: many 
children who are 10 years of age now, whose education must be already planned, will not be 
incorporated into the labour market by 2030.
6 Debonneuil (2017) proposes it as a solution for the French labour market, and thus requires the 
intervention of the French government.
7 There is very abundant recent literature on this topic. See, for example, Chace (2016).
8 The partisans of this position belong mainly to academic circles and leftist political parties and 
are organized in a Basic Income Earth Network (https://basicincome.org/about–bien/affiliates/) 
which also proposes much literature. The work of the political philosopher and social scientist 
Philippe Van Parijs (1993), from the Catholic University of Lovaine, is at the source of current 
argumentation in favour of the idea. Raventós (2017) is its main developer in Spain.
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ning, and we would experience a revolution of the same magnitude as the 
Neolitic or the Capitalist.
3.4. All kinds of problems
As practical solutions, all four present severe problems:
1.  Making people run against machines by training them through education 
appears to be a reasonable short–term strategy, but it is more difficult 
to imagine it as being successful in the long run. AI makes our current 
situation very different from previous ones. It is not only the human body 
(physical work, energy handling, etc.) that is now susceptible to machine 
competition, but also the human mind in its less mechanical aspects. 
Basing our strategy on an organized withdrawal to hopefully expanding 
niches may well fail for many young people.
2.  The second option appears to be more plausible, to the extent that the 
power of the nation–state is called to change the rules of economic com-
petition, particularly in markets affected most technologically. It requires, 
of course, that the new rules affect also imported goods, because if some-
one can produce abroad and sell in our country without sufficiently high 
trade tariffs, the model of cheap production with few jobs may well have 
the upper hand in the competition. It is also not clear to which extent this 
could be done in underdeveloped countries or weak states. 
3. The “moral control” of technology on a global scale is hardly possible wit-
hin our current institutional framework. It is very optimistic to say that 
“we have the freedom to limit and direct technology”: if “the freedom” 
means “the power”,9 we do not have it. Creating that global power as a po-
litical–legal reality seems a very desirable objective, but one unlikely to be 
achieved any time soon. On the other hand, the basic moral proposal of a 
job–friendly economy is far from clear, and thus less likely to obtain gene-
ral consensus. Replacing human workers with more productive machines 
is what humankind has been doing since the Neolithic era; no moral intui-
tion can condemn it (as it can, for example, condemn war, slavery or child 
abuse). On the other hand, limiting some economic uses of technology 
may block further useful technological developments, and so, even at the 
level of aggregated effects, the desirability of limiting technology may be 
strongly disputed.
4.  The fourth option raises the question of whether such deep civilizatio-
nal change can happen only in one country.10 Probably not. A significant 
9 We have the actual freedom to do something when it is a possibility open to us, a possibility we 
have the power to choose. Limiting and directing the use of new technology in the global econo-
mic competition, would requiere effective global political institutions to be real.
10 A different, more principled discussion has to do with the anthropological and ethical dimensi-
ons of work (Budd (2011) offers a good presentation on those dimensions). However, equaling 
“human work” with “salaried job” is a conceptual mistake, even if much used to oppose universal 
income proposals.
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degree of global governance would be necessary to change the compe-
titive conditions for all companies (in this case, the relation taxes paid / 
employment created) simultaneously. Trying to realize this only in one 
country would probably end in the attempt to isolate that economy and to 
restrict immigration heavily.
Conclusion
Dani Rodrik (2017) maintains that the three factors, namely hyper–globa-
lization, democracy and national sovereignty are not compatible. One can only 
combine effectively any two of these.
From our previous argument, it is easy to see why this happens especially 
with regard to young people: hyper–globalization places them in global competi-
tion for what matters most to them: their chance of getting a decent, stable job, 
on which their personal projects and their social integration depend. If they are 
ill–prepared and poor (two things that often go together) their chance is even 
slimmer. 
Establishing and enforcing global rules for global markets is not possible 
without some kind of effective political global arrangement. However, national 
sovereignty prevents it. Universal agreements have proven to be very difficult 
between sovereign countries, whose governments are, in turn, subject to internal 
electoral competition. 
Internal competition for political power through free and fair elections is an 
essential element of democracy. As we have seen in Europe lately, workers and 
entrepreneurs who have a fear of scoring low in some global competitions, use 
their political capacity as voters to restrict those competitions and to re–create 
a national, less open, economic competition under the umbrella of the nation–
state. 
Corresponding nationalism, as has already been much experienced in the 
past, ends in commercial wars, armed wars and imperialism, in general, given 
that each democratic state finds it desirable to globalize only the competitions 
that its workers and companies are likely to win. Those are the global competiti-
ons that the losers would try, in turn, to impede by resorting to their democratic 
and sovereign States. 
The anti–system sentiment among the poor and middle–class youth is basi-
cally an anti–globalization stance, due to the precarization of their opportunities 
for jobs. Marine Le Pen (2012:15) summarizes this in a few words:
Je ferai donc ici une analyse du projet mondialiste, du rôle joué dans sa réalisation 
par nos élites politiques, médiatiques et financières, de la guerre qu’elles mènent au 
peuple, à la République et à la Nation, et de la violence contre la démocratie à laqu-
elle elles sont résolues pour se maintenir en place.
Anti–globalization far–right rethoric is articulated around the concept of na-
tional identity, while anti–globalization rethoric of the extreme–left is used to 
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take an anti–corporation stance. The two types of rethoric may be emotionally 
different, but in practice they are very similar. They both propose a strong na-
tion–state (as the defender of national sovereignty against foreign or globalist 
interests, or as the defender of popular sovereignty against corporate interests), 
able to restrict globalization and thus the competition that the domestic youth 
are experiencing in the labour market. Their young voters understand well the 
economic issue behind this rethoric, and so they move easily from one form of 
rethoric to another, changing their voting behaviour accordingly. They seem not 
to resent the fact that leftist socialist and rightist nationalist parties govern to-
gether. They act as quite coherent historical materialists.
As was mentioned above, the measures implemented by many governments to 
face the crisis consisted of lowering the price of labour (to limit unemployment) 
and simultaneously cutting public expenses (to limit deficit). The unavoidable 
consequence is to diminish economic perspectives for young workers both in the-
ir job prospects and in the ability of the government to provide a social security 
protection network.
According to this logic, we can suppose that, as the economic crisis recedes 
and consumption rises, we shall be back to “business as usual”, labour will reco-
ver its previous positions, and anti–system sentiment will go down among the po-
pulation in general and the youth in particular. This process can be slow, howe-
ver, due to three factors: 
• Rethorical progress made by nationalist and/or strongly left–wing ideas, 
that can outlive its economic roots, mainly as it affirms itself in regard to 
the problems of civic coexistence.
• Growing awareness of political and administrative corruption following 
the crisis itself, that gives an electoral advantage to those who have occupi-
ed hardly any positions of power, and thus handled no big public budgets.
• Legal changes introduced by a protectionist mindset in several parts of 
the world (Brexit, migration and refugee policies in many countries of the 
EU, commercial tariffs by Mr. Trump), which may demonstrate substanti-
al inertia and hamper global economic recovery.
Even if the slippage of anti–globalization positions is slow and shows a cer-
tain delay in time with regard to economic recovery, the story goes that it will 
happen quickly enough to prevent anti–globalization political programs from ga-
ining more government positions. Democracy requires electoral majorities, and 
strong anti–system discontent can only be dominant in the context of a protrac-
ted economic crisis. Outside the crisis context many old “anti–systems” will note 
that they have acquired opportunities in life that need to be sheltered within the 
system.
This prognosis may well be correct, except for the one factor mentioned abo-
ve: the young workers face not only a diminished demand due to the crisis (which 
will not be more of a problem with the global recovery of consumption) and 
increased competition by migrant workers (whose numbers may be limited by 
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restrictive migration policies), but they mainly face the competition of the rapidly 
growing presence of machines in many production operations.
This is not a result of the crisis, even if the crisis has clearly accelerated the 
digitalization process of the economies, in order to reduce the unitary costs and 
remain competitive in a more difficult market. The recovery of GDP after the 
crisis is being made in Europe with a smaller recovery in the number and average 
cost of jobs.
However, the trend itself has little to do with temporary market problems and 
much to do with technological competition among companies. If your competi-
tors are lowering their unity prices by means of digitalization, you have to do ba-
sically the same or go out of business. That is, the difficulties for the youth in the 
labour market are structural, not merely due to the economic aspect of the crisis. 
They must not be understood even as a movement from one plateau to another 
(as occurred after World War II in Europe) but from one semi–plateau (the 
industrial economy of the ’50s and ’60s) to an exponential dynamics of increased 
occupation of “labour spaces” by machines, fueled by the private companies in 
competition. The harder the competition (the broader and less oligopolistic the 
markets), the quicker we can expect this dynamics to be.
As we have seen, the difficulty for young people to get a decent job has not 
had a good response within the current institutional framework, and so, a mixed 
multi–layered response must be designed eclectically taking from the four opti-
ons above what may work best: 
1.  In the short term, all educational efforts must be undertaken to prepare 
people for the remaining niches, where no technology is able to enter or a 
serious profitability fight can be put up by human labour. Also in the short 
term, Job Guarantee Programs may be implemented to mitigate extreme 
social situations leading to political instability.
2.  In the medium term, elaborated services provided by qualified workers 
plus computers may compete with mere machines, able to produce chea-
per articles but of lesser quality.
3.  In the long term, all efforts must be made to build global political capacity 
sufficiently to adapt conditions to the use of technology in economic com-
petition, so that it promotes the common good for humankind. Whether 
preserving jobs is part of that common good, or perhaps implementing a 
universal basic income, or the creation of new cyborg–like human beings 
makes an interesting anthropological discussion, no doubt. However, it 
seems somewhat meaningless to concentrate on the best possible use of a 
political instrument which we are far from having at our disposal.
All these measures, unfortunately, are unlikely to provide a convincing per-
spective of stable and predictable income for most young people, even if we ma-
nage to leave this long economic crisis behind. Anti–system sentiment, populist 
political positions, and the consequent instability of the system itself, may still 
have quite a future ahead.
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Tržište rada za mlade, populizam i digitalizacija ekonomija
Raúl González Fabre*
Sažetak
Tijekom posljednjeg desetljeća mladež je suočena jakim konkurencijskim pritiscima 
na tržištu rada o kojem ovisi većina njih u smislu stabilnog temelja za životni projekt 
koji upravo započinju. Neki pritisci dolaze zbog činjenice da se s prethodno nave-
denim poklapa pojavljivanje stranih migranata na najnižim ešalonima istoga tržišta. 
Drugi pritisci su uzrokovani mjerama koje su vlade poduzele kako bi držale pod kon-
trolom krizu izazvanu nezaposlenošću kao i javnim deficitom. Ti pritisci su postavili 
temelje političkim povezivanjem sa ksenofobičnim skupinama i skupinama koje 
rade protiv sustava. Međutim, završetak krize (konjunkturni događaj s ekonomskog 
stajališta) neće vjerojatno značiti snažan oporavak tržišta rada za mlade. Unutar tog 
tržišta oblikuje se strukturalna promjena: naime, radi se o silovitom nametanju stro-
jeva s umjetnom inteligencijom te progresivna zamjena ljudske radne snage. Za raz-
liku od konjunkturalnih konkurencijskih sila, to utječe na tržište rada na mnogo više 
razina, vođeno je privatnim kapitalom (a ne državom niti pojedinim migrantima) i 
neće dugo trajati, ali će rasti što je brže moguće (zbog konkurencije između privatnih 
tvrtki). Predlažu se mogući odgovori na taj izazov, od izjave da izazov ne postoji kao 
fenomen “neto stvaranja novih radnih mjesta” te da su potrebne samo promjene 
u obrazovanju pa do implementacije univerzalnog osnovnog prihoda, čija je nam-
jera odvojiti prihod od rada stvarajući time istinski civilizacijski obrat. S praktičnog 
stajališta, gore navedeno ima ozbiljne nedostatke. Mješovita strategija kombiniran-
ja nekih prijedloga bit će možda najbolji pristup za nadolazeće godine. Međutim, 
strukturalno pitanje ostat će i dalje važan društveni izazov, pitanje koje će možda 
promicati radikalna, anti–globalizacijska i anti–kapitalistička politička stajališta 
među mladima. Emocije uperene protiv sustava, populistička politička stajališta te 
nestabilnost samog sustava koja slijedi morat će se rješavati u budućnosti.
Ključne riječi: tržište rada, umjetna inteligencija, ekonomska konkurencija, kse-
nofobija, antisistemske politike
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